This week we’re investigating philosophy’s applicability with democracy and politics. We’ve been asking ourselves whether more philosophy makes people more equipped for democratic participation. Starting this project – that was probably the biggest assumption we were operating with, that philosophic minds make great citizens. This week we’ve been looking into the history of philosophy in politics and vice versa. Hannah Arendt’s lecture-made-essay “Philosophy and Politics” has been an essential historical reference for this exploration – and an essay we highly recommend checking out. Let’s dive into it!

 

Historically there has always been a fundamental divide between politics and philosophy. How the two were practiced made them into polar-opposites. Aristotle famously said; hé rhétoriké estin antistrophos té dialektiké (the art of persuasion [and therefore the political art of speech] is the counterpart of the art of dialectic [the art of philosophical speech]. Dialectics – as opposed to rhetoric – is a philosophical dialog between only two people. The goal of such conversations was to come closer to finding episteme, the unrelative truths of universal proportions. Rhetoric on the other hand, – the art of persuasion – has always been fundamentally relative and anchored in the realm of opinions. Because, persuasion does not come from truths, it comes from opinions, as Hannah Arendt points out. Politics is making decision – not of what is most true, but of which choice is best or good (Kalon K’ Agathon) for human beings. What is best or good for humans – is of course relative to whom it may concern, and which way you view it. Another word of “how you view it”, is opinion – it is not a truth in itself, it is an educated (or not) opinion of what is best for x, y, z at this given time. Further, if you wish to convince a number of people of your opinion – as in a political realm – you ought to use the methods and tools of rhetoric, not philosophy. In addressing relativity, one must be relative: Kairos, the relativistic notion of ‘the right word to the right time’ – has always been the essential tenant of rhetoric. The relative nature of rhetoric, was historically what made it to be the opposite of the universally true (episteme) – and further, an adversary of any truth-seeker (philosopher). This is what made politics inadequate for philosophical truth-seeking – and even more important – what made philosophy inadequate for the opinionated politics. As mentioned in our previous essay, the polis (city/citymen) made a difference between wise men (Sophos) and men with knowledge about human affairs (Phronimos). They essential thought philosophers were too preoccupied with truth of the universe and not with what is most useful/good. In other words, made pretty bad citizens. Now, looking back to our initial question of whether more philosophy makes for better citizens – historically it seems – the answer is no.

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However, the universality of truths – in modern times, with the implosion of inherent meaning – has shifted, and become more relative. Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics marked a new discontinuity or break with the Platonian view on absolute truths. What followed is string of European philosophers – which in English-speaking terms is often dubbed the continental philosophy, but more precisely is called existentialism. Our question is, what happens if truths, being eternal and universal law – as with Plato’s philosophical project – stop being such? What then happens with the historical divide between philosophy and politics? The essentials of politics and democracy hasn’t changed much since its emergence. Of course, it has been influenced a lot by the dawn of modern science – but is fundamentally the clash of opinions. What happens when philosophy also become more relative – does it increase its compatibility with politics? This is something we must investigate further – if we hope to get to the bottom of whether philosophy makes good citizens.